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Purpose of MACs
• Used to protect integrity and guarantee 
origin of data strings.
• Sender and verifier share a secret key (of 
k bits).
• Sender inputs data and key to MAC 
algorithm – output is MAC (short string of 
bits) which is sent/stored with data.
• Verifier recomputes MAC using received 
message and secret key and compares.
CBC-MACs
• A CBC-MAC is a particular (very popular) 
type of MAC.
• Computed using a block cipher in CBC 
(Cipher Block Chaining) mode.
• Write eK(P) for block cipher encryption of 
block P (n bits) using secret key K (k bits).
• Similarly, write dK(C) for block cipher 
decryption of block C using key K. 
CBC-MAC operation
• Divide and pad data to be MACed into n-
bit blocks D1, D2, …, Dq (n is block length 
of block cipher, e.g. n = 64 for DES).
• The MAC is computed by:
– put H1 = eK(D1),
– for i = 2, 3, ..., q:  put  Hi = eK(Di ⊕ Hi-1).
• Hq is then subject to an ‘optional process’
and truncated to m bits to give the MAC.
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Padding
• Three well known padding methods:
– Method 1:  add minimum no. of zeros to 
make a whole number of blocks.
– Method 2:  add single one followed by 
zeros to make a whole number of blocks.
– Method 3:   right-pad with zeros as 
necessary.  Left-pad with extra n-bit block 
containing binary representation of bit-
length of unpadded string.
• Padding not sent with MACed message.
Trailing zeros forgeries
• Padding Method 1 allows attacker to add 
or delete trailing zeros from a message 
without changing the MAC.  A forgery 
attack.
• Arises from fact that Padding Method 1 is 
not a one-to-one function, i.e. up to n
unpadded messages map to the same 
padded message.
• Motive for introduction of Method 2.
Need for optional process
• Suppose a CBC-MAC is computed with no 
optional process and no truncation (SMAC).
• Suppose we have the MACs for two one-
block messages:
MAC1 = eK(D1),    MAC2 = eK(D2).
• Then MAC2 is a valid MAC on the two block 
message:  D1 || D2 ⊕ MAC1.
• Need to add optional process (or padding 
method 3) to avoid this ‘cut and paste’
Forgery attack.
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Optional processes
• Two well-known optional processes:
– choose a key K1 and compute:
Hq′′ = eK(dK1(Hq)),
– choose a key K1 and compute:
Hq′ = eK1(Hq).
• First method results in ANSI Retail MAC 
(ARMAC) when block cipher = DES
• Second method often called EMAC.
Standard CBC-MACs
• ISO/IEC standard for CBC-MACs 
(ISO/IEC 9797-1: 1999) contains 6 
schemes.
• First three are as follows:
– Alg. 1 = CBC-MAC with no optional process 
(SMAC).
– Alg. 2 = CBC-MAC with optional process as 
single extra encryption (EMAC).
– Alg. 3 = CBC-MAC with optional process as 
extra decryption and encryption (i.e., triple 
encrypt last block) (ARMAC).
EMAC security
• EMAC has a proof of security (Petrank & 
Rackoff, 2000).
• For block ciphers with large enough n and 
k (128 or more), EMAC is sound choice –
with padding method 2 or 3.
• For block ciphers with small k (e.g. DES: 
k=56), EMAC insecure, because of simple 
meet-in-the-middle key recovery attack.
• Attack complexity: O(2k) encryptions with 1 
known MAC.
ARMAC security
• Problems with EMAC (and SMAC), combined 
with desire to use DES, motivates design of 
ARMAC.
• ARMAC seems much more resistant to key 
recovery attacks than EMAC (no proof however).
• Key recovery attack either requires triple DES 
break (2k encryptions + 2k storage) or large 
number (2n/2) of known MACs combined with 
single DES break (2k encryptions).
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Rationale
• The standardisation of a block cipher 
(AES) with larger n and k, means that it 
seems appropriate to re-examine ways in 
which we use block ciphers.
• Modes of operation and commonly used 
CBC-MAC schemes are quite ‘old’
designs.
• Can we do better?
NIST process
• NIST has an ongoing project to produce new 
‘modes’ standards for DES.
• Objective: produce combined encryption + 
integrity mode (proposal for review in NIST 
Special Publication 800-38C, September 2003).
• Objective: CBC-MAC standard for AES.
• NIST activity mirrored in ISO, where ISO/IEC 
9797-1 currently under review, and Data 
Encapsulation Mechanisms (DEMs) work just 
starting (DEM = combined encryption/integrity).
Candidate schemes
• A number of candidate CBC-MAC 
schemes have been proposed, including:
– RMAC (Jaulmes, Joux and Valette, 2002),
– XCBC (Black and Rogaway, 2000), and
– TMAC and OMAC (Iwata and Kurosawa, 
2003).
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RMAC
• RMAC operates as follows.
• Two block cipher keys required (K, K1).
• To generate a MAC first generate a 
random salt R (of k bits).
• Then, using the model previously 
described, RMAC involves the optional 
process:
Hq′ = eK1⊕R (Hq).
Rationale of RMAC
• Typically, a CBC-MAC scheme will be 
subject to forgery attacks requiring O(2n/2) 
known/chosen MACs (based on ‘birthday 
paradox’ probability).
• For ‘short block’ block ciphers (e.g. 3DES, 
IDEA, … with n = 64) this is sometimes a 
little ‘close’ to what is possible.
• RMAC objective is to offer greater 
resistance to ‘birthday’ forgery attacks. 
NIST draft
• RMAC was included in NIST special 
publication 800-38B (November 2002) –
essentially a draft standard.
• At that time RMAC was clearly the leading 
candidate for standardisation.
Reaction to 800-38B
• The release of NIST SP 800-38B 
provoked a large number of negative 
comments.
• The result is that RMAC is no longer being 
seriously considered for NIST adoption.
• The original SP 800-38B and the main 
comments are available for download at 
the NIST website.
A simple observation
• Suppose know one RMAC (M say) for 
data D (using salt R, say).
• Request another MAC (M' say) for the 
same data D (uses salt R' say).
• Then immediately know that:
dK1⊕R (M) = dK1⊕R' (M').
• Enables exhaustive search for K1 with 
complexity 2k (and just 2 known MACs).
• This contradicts claims in SP 800-38B.
Some attacks on RMAC
• In (Knudsen & Mitchell, J. Crypt., to 
appear) a series of partial key recovery
attacks on RMAC are presented.
• Enable one of the two RMAC keys (K1) to 
be recovered with much less than 2k work.
• Once K1 is known, very simple forgery 
attacks become possible (based on ‘cut 
and paste’ attack).
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XCBC
• XCBC, another CBC-MAC scheme, was 
proposed by Black & Rogaway in 2000.
• Objective was to define a provably secure 
CBC-MAC which minimises number of 
block cipher encryptions/decryptions.
• Address fact that EMAC + pad method 2 
can involve 2 ‘extra’ encryptions by 
comparison with SMAC + pad method 1.
XCBC operation  I
• XCBC does not quite fit the general CBC-
MAC model presented earlier.
• Use padding method 2 if data string needs 
padding; otherwise do not pad.
• Avoid ambiguity problems by computing 
MAC differently depending on whether or 
not padding was performed.
• Three keys: K, K1 and K2 (K has k bits, & 
K1, K2 have n bits).
XCBC operation  II
• If no padding then exor K1 with Dq (last 
data block).
• If padding used then exor K2 with Dq.
• Then compute SMAC on (modified) data 
using key K.
XCBC properties
• Same number of encryptions as SMAC 
with padding method 1, yet forgery 
problems removed.
• Proof of security exists.
• Hence optimally efficient with respect to 
block cipher operations, BUT largish key 
(384 bits for AES). 
TMAC
• To reduce key size, Kurosawa and Iwata 
(2003) proposed TMAC (T for ‘two key’) 
using keys K (of k bits) and K' of n bits.
• Derive K1 and K2 from K' by putting K2 = K'
and K1 = u.K' where multiplication takes 
place in GF(2n).
• Compute MAC as for XCBC.
• TMAC still has a proof of security.
OMAC
• Iwata and Kurosawa (2003) have recently 
proposed OMAC (O for ‘one-key’) using 
just one key K (of k bits).
• Derive K' from K by setting K' = eK(0n).
• Then derive K1 and K2 from K' as for 
TMAC.
• Finally, compute MAC as for XCBC.
• OMAC again has a proof of security.
NIST statement
• NIST have not yet published a new draft 
on CBC-MACs, but have indicated that 
they are leaning towards OMAC.
• There is also an ‘open call’ for comments 
on all CBC-MAC schemes.
• Some comments exist on NIST website.
• Thus, now is the time to provide input to 
NIST!
Partial key recovery attack on TMAC
• Sung, Hong & Lee (2003) described attack 
against TMAC which allows recovery of K'
given O(2n/2) known/chosen MACs and 
trivial computation (no key search).
• Recovering K still requires 2k work, and 
proof of security not challenged.
• However, knowing K' does make very 
trivial forgeries possible.
OMAC attacks
• The TMAC attack works against OMAC, 
as does a further (different) attack, both 
allowing recovery of K‘ given O(2n/2) 
known/chosen MACs.
• As Iwata has pointed out, this is no longer 
a partial key recovery attack, since K' is 
not part of the key (but is derived from it) –
unlike TMAC.
• Nevertheless, recovery of K' would allow 
very trivial forgeries.
What does it mean?
• These attacks do not contradict proofs of 
security for OMAC and TMAC.
• None of the proofs say anything about 
security once an attacker has O(2n/2) 
known MACs.
• However, it is arguable that one should 
still be concerned about what happens at 
the ‘boundaries’ of the security proof.
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Where next?
• The main choice right now (for NIST) 
would appear to be between EMAC and 
OMAC.
• Both have similar provable security.
• OMAC is more efficient.
• However EMAC appears stronger just 
outside envelope of security proof.
• Views are needed, both for NIST and in 
near future for ISO.
